Wanting what’s not best

Philosophical Studies 179 (4):1275-1296 (2021)

Abstract

In this paper, we propose a novel account of desire reports, i.e. sentences of the form 'S wants p'. Our theory is partly motivated by Phillips-Brown's (2021) observation that subjects can desire things even if those things aren't best by the subject's lights. That is, being best isn't necessary for being desired. We compare our proposal to existing theories, and show that it provides a neat account of the central phenomenon.

Analytics

Added to PP
2021-07-10

Downloads
201 (#59,767)

6 months
37 (#23,660)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Kyle H. Blumberg
Australian Catholic University
John Hawthorne
Australian Catholic University

Citations of this work

On Preferring.Kyle Blumberg - forthcoming - Linguistics and Philosophy:1-30.
Reasoning About Want.Hillary Harner & Sangeet Khemlani - 2022 - Cognitive Science 46 (9).

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

A New Hope.Kyle Blumberg & John Hawthorne - 2022 - Journal of Philosophy 119 (1):5-32.
Philosophy and Desire.Hugh J. Silverman (ed.) - 2000 - Routledge.
Harmony, Purity, Truth.Graham Oddie - 1994 - Mind 103 (412):451-472.
Belief, Desire, and Revision.D. Collins - 1988 - Mind 97 (July):333-42.
The "Guise of the Ought to Be": A Deontic View of the Intentionality of Desire.Federico Lauria - 2017 - In Federico Lauria & Julien Deonna (eds.), The Nature of Desire. New York: Oxford University Press.
Desire as Belief.David Lewis - 1988 - Mind 97 (418):323-32.
Imagination, Desire, and Irrationality: A Defense of I-Desire Account.Yuchen Guo - 2021 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 29 (1):77-89.
Getting what you want.Lyndal Grant & Milo Phillips-Brown - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (7):1791-1810.