Abstract

While Epictetus’Diatribaiare not an ethical treatise, but aim chiefly at urging and training pupils to practice philosophy, they can also be used to reconstruct Epictetus’ positions about some of the questions raised within the Stoa after Zeno. This paper focuses on the problem of the contribution of indifferent (external or bodily) things to happiness and of the relationship between virtue and these indifferents. Against scholars claiming that Epictetus shared Aristo of Chios’ heterodox indifferentism, it is shown that Epictetus upholds Chrysippus’ ethical doctrine of thetelosand acknowledges that some indifferents are natural or have ‘value’ (axia) and should not be despised or ignored. In making this point, Epictetus uses the concept of ‘good reasonning’ about value which can be traced back to Diogenes of Seleucia (and Antipater of Tarsus). Moreover, when he describes how we can reach the goal of life through our natural faculties, Epictetus might also borrow Panetius’ explanation of thetelos.