Philosophia:1-8 (2020)

Authors
Abstract
Tom Dougherty (2013) argues that the following moral principles are inconsistent: (α) it is impermissible to benefit many people slightly rather than save someone’s life, and (β) it is permissible to risk someone’s life slightly to benefit them slightly. This inconsistency has highly counterintuitive consequences for non-consequentialist moral theories. However, Dougherty’s argument, the “Repetition Argument,” relies on a premise that ignores a morally important distinction between acting with statistical knowledge and acting with individualized knowledge. According to this premise, if it is permissible to make it near certain that a distribution obtains, then it is permissible to bring about that distribution. I will argue that this premise proves too much for the Repetition Argument, and so we should reject it. Finally, to further motivate my own objection, I show that a recent objection to the Repetition Argument by James R. Kirkpatrick (2018) does not resolve the inconsistency.
Keywords Risk  Beneficence  Chance  Aggregation  Statistical Knowledge  Permissibility
Categories No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11406-020-00233-2
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 55,935
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Aggregation, Beneficence, and Chance.Tom Dougherty - 2013 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 7 (2):1-19.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Aggregation, Beneficence, and Chance.Tom Dougherty - 2013 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 7 (2):1-19.
Single Premise Deduction and Risk.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 141 (2):157 - 173.
Limited Aggregation and Risk.Seth Lazar - 2018 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 46 (2):117-159.
On the Cognitive Argument for Cost-Benefit Analysis.Andreas Christiansen - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (2):217-230.
Token-Reflexivity and Repetition.Alexandru Radulescu - 2018 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 5:745-763.
Argument From Chance.Dariusz Łukasiewicz - 2015 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 7 (1):199--207.
Morality and Risk.David Patrick Mccarthy - 1995 - Dissertation, University of Southern California
Søren Kierkegaard’s Repetition. Existence in Motion.Ionuț Alexandru Bârliba - 2014 - Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 1 (1):23-49.
Risk-Benefit Analysis: From a Logical Point of View. [REVIEW]Georg Spielthenner - 2012 - Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 9 (2):161-170.
Continuity in Morality and Law.Re'em Segev - forthcoming - Theoretical Inquiries in Law.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2020-06-12

Total views
9 ( #885,907 of 2,403,176 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
9 ( #77,191 of 2,403,176 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes