Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (2):184-189 (1972)

Bruce Langtry
University of Melbourne
This article considers recent arguments against the proposition that one and the same object cannot go out of existence and then come into existence again (so that, e.g., teleportation would involve change of identity.). It argues that these arguments can be evaded by adopting a four-dimensional ontology, according to which human beings, trees, etc., have temporal as well as spatial parts.
Keywords identity  four-dimensionalism  continuity
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DOI 10.1080/00048407212341221
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Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist.Stephen Toulmin - 1950 - Science and Society 14 (4):353-360.

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