The relativity of perceptual knowledge

Synthese 94 (2):145-169 (1993)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Since the most promising path to a solution to the problem of skepticism regarding perceptual knowledge seems to rest on a sharp distinction between perceiving and inferring, I begin by clarifying and defending that distinction. Next, I discuss the chief obstacle to success by this path, the difficulty in making the required distinction between merely logical possibilities that one is mistaken and the real (Austin) or relevant (Dretske) possibilities which would exclude knowledge. I argue that this distinction cannot be drawn in the ways Austin and Dretske suggest without begging the questions at issue. Finally, I sketch and defend a more radical way of identifying relevant possibilities that is inspired by Austin's controversial suggestion of a parallel between saying I know and saying I promise: a claim of knowledge of some particular matter is relative to a context in which questions about the matter have been raised

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,349

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Dretske on knowledge closure.Steven Luper - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (3):379 – 394.
Perceptual knowledge derailed.Jonathan Schaffer - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 112 (1):31-45.
Perceptual knowledge.John L. Pollock - 1971 - Philosophical Review 80 (3):287-319.
Perceptual knowledge.Jonathan Dancy (ed.) - 1988 - New York: Oxford University Press.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
155 (#118,891)

6 months
17 (#142,297)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Thought.Gilbert Harman - 1973 - Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press.
Sense and Sensibilia.John Langshaw Austin - 1962 - Oxford University Press. Edited by G. Warnock.
Philosophical papers.John Langshaw Austin - 1961 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by J. O. Urmson & G. J. Warnock.
Knowledge and the flow of information.F. Dretske - 1989 - Trans/Form/Ação 12:133-139.
Seeing And Knowing.Fred I. Dretske - 1969 - Chicago: University Of Chicago Press.

View all 24 references / Add more references