Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology and Divine Revelation

Philosophia 42 (2):309-320 (2014)
Abstract
Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology (ALVE) states that for S to have knowledge, S must have a virtuously formed safe true belief. S’s belief that p is safe if, in most near-by possible worlds where S’s belief is formed in the same manner as in the actual world, S’s belief is true. S’s safe belief that p is virtuously formed if S’s safe belief is formed using reliable and well-integrated cognitive processes and it is to S’s credit that she formed the belief. In this paper, I offer a novel counterexample to ALVE. I offer a case where an individual forms a belief on the basis of divine revelation. Intuitively the person has knowledge, but ALVE predicts otherwise. The upshot is not only that we have a counter example to ALVE, but also, that ALVE may not serve the needs of an adequate religious epistemology
Keywords Anti-luck virtue epistemology  Safety  Virtue epistemology  Divine revelation
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DOI 10.1007/s11406-013-9514-6
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References found in this work BETA
Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Oxford University Press UK.
Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology.Duncan Pritchard - 2012 - Journal of Philosophy 109 (3):247-279.
Anti-Luck Epistemology.Duncan Pritchard - 2007 - Synthese 158 (3):277-297.

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