Emotionally Relevant Feelings

Dissertation, University of California, Santa Barbara (1990)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this thesis I argue that emotion can not be adequately defined in terms of sensation, normative belief , nor a combination of the two. Emotion does entail "feeling" however, and explaining the sense of feeling which is relevant to defining emotion is the central aim of this thesis. In brief, I will show that the "emotionally relevant" sense of feeling is intentional in itself--but it is not to be identified with bodily sensation as feelings "traditionally" have been treated, nor is it to be reduced to normative belief, which is how "cognitive theorists" have explained the intentionality of emotion. The feeling essential to emotion is irreducibly intentional and affective in nature: It is distinctively affective and can not be analysed in terms of "component parts." ;A proper analysis of the concept of emotion requires somewhat more than an explanation of "emotionally relevant feeling" though. For as the cognitive theorists have correctly maintained, one can "have an emotion" for quite some time without having to continuously feel or experience it. So while I mainly define emotion in terms of ERF, I add to this the concept of "dispositional emotion" which accounts for emotions that are not always felt. Finally, I discuss the connection between the concept of emotion and ERF, as well as the connection between emotions and moods, and emotions and behavior

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,960

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Standing up for an affective account of emotion.Demian Whiting - 2006 - Philosophical Explorations 9 (3):261-276.
An anti‐essentialist view of the emotions.Joel J. Kupperman - 1995 - Philosophical Psychology 8 (4):341-351.
How can emotions be both cognitive and bodily?Michelle Maiese - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (4):513-531.
Affective intentionality and the feeling body.Jan Slaby - 2008 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (4):429-444.
The Feeling Theory of Emotion and the Object-Directed Emotions.Demian Whiting - 2009 - European Journal of Philosophy 19 (2):281-303.
Emotion, Object and Justification.Bonnelle Lewis Strickling - 1984 - Dissertation, The University of British Columbia (Canada)
The unity of emotion: An unlikely Aristotelian solution.Maria Magoula Adamos - 2007 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 28 (2):101-114.
Goldie's Puzzling Two Feelings:'Bodily Feeling 'and'Feeling Toward '.Sunny Yang - 2009 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 16 (3):317-327.

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-02-07

Downloads
0

6 months
0

Historical graph of downloads

Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Mary I. Bockover
Humboldt State University

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references