On the Differences Between Practical and Cognitive Presumptions
Argumentation 35 (2):287-320 (2021)
Abstract
The study of presumptions has intensified in argumentation theory over the last years. Although scholars put forward different accounts, they mostly agree that presumptions can be studied in deliberative and epistemic contexts, have distinct contextual functions, and promote different kinds of goals. Accordingly, there are “practical” and “cognitive” presumptions. In this paper, I show that the differences between practical and cognitive presumptions go far beyond contextual considerations. The central aim is to explore Nicholas Rescher’s contention that both types of presumptions have a closely analogous pragmatic function, i.e., that practical and cognitive presumptions are made to avoid greater harm in circumstances of epistemic uncertainty. By comparing schemes of practical and cognitive reasoning, I show that Rescher’s contention requires qualifications. Moreover, not only do practical and cognitive presumptions have distinct pragmatic functions, but they also perform different dialogical functions and, in some circumstances, cannot be defeated by the same kinds of evidence. Hence, I conclude that the two classes of presumptions merit distinct treatment in argumentation theory.My notes
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Citations of this work
On the Differences Between Practical and Cognitive Presumptions.Petar Bodlović - 2021 - Argumentation 35 (2):287-320.
On Presumptions, Burdens of Proof, and Explanations.Petar Bodlović - 2020 - Informal Logic 40 (2):255-294.
References found in this work
Argumentation Schemes.Douglas Walton, Chris Reed & Fabrizio Macagno - 2008 - Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
Argumentation Schemes.Douglas Walton, Christopher Reed & Fabrizio Macagno - 2008 - Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
Dialectics: A Controversy-Oriented Approach to the Theory of Knowledge.Nicholas Rescher - 1977 - State University of New York Press.