Hutcheson and his Critics and Opponents on the Moral Sense

Journal of Scottish Philosophy 20 (2):143-161 (2022)
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Abstract

This paper takes a new look at Francis Hutcheson's moral sense theory and examines it in light of the views of his rationalist critics and opponents who claim that there has to be an antecedent moral standard prior to any sense or affections. I examine how Gilbert Burnet, Samuel Clarke, and Catharine Trotter Cockburn each argue for the priority of reason over a moral sense and how Hutcheson responds or could respond to their views. Furthermore, I consider the proposal that rather than regarding Hutcheson's moral sense theory as fundamentally opposed to moral rationalism, Hutcheson and Clarke endorse a shared moral metaphysics, as argued by Patricia Sheridan. Although I consider this proposal as too broad and believe it overlooks relevant metaphysical differences between Clarke and Hutcheson, I argue that the dispute between Hutcheson and his critics and opponents will not be settled without taking their underlying moral metaphysics into consideration.

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Ruth Boeker
University College Dublin

Citations of this work

Samuel Clarke.Timothy Yenter & Ezio Vailati - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Catharine Trotter Cockburn.Patricia Sheridan - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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