Ashley on gender identity

Journal of Controversial Ideas 4 (1):1-10 (2024)
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Abstract

‘Gender identity’ was clearly defined sixty years ago, but the dominant conceptions of gender identity today are deeply obscure. Florence Ashley’s 2023 theory of gender identity is one of the latest attempts at demystification. Although Ashley’s paper is not fully coherent, a coherent theory of gender identity can be extracted from it. That theory, we argue, is clearly false. It is psychologically very implausible, and does not support ‘first­person authority over gender’, as Ashley claims. We also discuss other errors and confusions in Ashley’s paper.

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Author Profiles

Tomas Bogardus
Pepperdine University
Alex Byrne
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

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