Authors
Paul Boghossian
New York University
Abstract
The paper asks under what conditions deductive reasoning transmits justification from its premises to its conclusion. It argues that both standard externalist and standard internalist accounts of this phenomenon fail. The nature of this failure is taken to indicate the way forward: basic forms of deductive reasoning must justify by being instances of ‘blind but blameless’ reasoning. Finally, the paper explores the suggestion that an inferentialist account of the logical constants can help explain how such reasoning is possible.
Keywords Epistemology
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DOI 10.1111/1467-8349.00110
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References found in this work BETA

The Runabout Inference-Ticket.A. N. Prior - 1960 - Analysis 21 (2):38.
The Future of the A Priori.Gilbert Harman - 2003 - Journal of Philosophical Research 28 (Supplement):23-34.

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Citations of this work BETA

What is Inference?Paul Boghossian - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (1):1-18.
Anti-Exceptionalism About Logic.Ole Thomassen Hjortland - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (3):631-658.
Extended Rationality: A Hinge Epistemology.Annalisa Coliva - 2015 - London, England: Palgrave-Macmillan.
Slurring Words.Luvell Anderson & Ernie Lepore - 2013 - Noûs 47 (1):25-48.

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