Blind reasoning

Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 77 (1):225–248 (2003)
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Abstract

The paper asks under what conditions deductive reasoning transmits justification from its premises to its conclusion. It argues that both standard externalist and standard internalist accounts of this phenomenon fail. The nature of this failure is taken to indicate the way forward: basic forms of deductive reasoning must justify by being instances of ‘blind but blameless’ reasoning. Finally, the paper explores the suggestion that an inferentialist account of the logical constants can help explain how such reasoning is possible.

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Paul Boghossian
New York University

References found in this work

The Runabout Inference-Ticket.A. N. Prior - 1960 - Analysis 21 (2):38-39.
The Future of the A Priori.Gilbert Harman - 2003 - Journal of Philosophical Research 28 (9999):23-34.

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