Blind reasoning


Authors
Paul Boghossian
New York University
Abstract
The paper asks under what conditions deductive reasoning transmits justification from its premises to its conclusion. It argues that both standard externalist and standard internalist accounts of this phenomenon fail. The nature of this failure is taken to indicate the way forward: basic forms of deductive reasoning must justify by being instances of ‘blind but blameless’ reasoning. Finally, the paper explores the suggestion that an inferentialist account of the logical constants can help explain how such reasoning is possible.
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DOI 10.1111/1467-8349.00110
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What is Inference?Paul Boghossian - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (1):1-18.
Epistemic Entitlement.Peter J. Graham - 2012 - Noûs 46 (3):449-482.
Slurring Words.Luvell Anderson & Ernie Lepore - 2013 - Noûs 47 (1):25-48.
Could Evolution Explain Our Reliability About Logic?Joshua Schechter - 2013 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology 4. pp. 214.

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