Content and self-knowledge

Philosophical Topics 17 (1):5-26 (1989)
Abstract
This paper argues that, given a certain apparently inevitable thesis about content, we could not know our own minds. The thesis is that the content of a thought is determined by its relational properties
Keywords Cognition  Content  Metaphysics  Mine  Self-knowledge
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DOI 10.5840/philtopics198917110
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The Phenomenology of Cognition, or, What is It Like to Think That P?David Pitt - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):1-36.
The Significance of Cognitive Phenomenology.Declan Smithies - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (8):731-743.

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