Cognitive science and the analytic/synthetic distinction: Comments on Horwich

Philosophical Issues 3:135-142 (1993)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Quine is usually read as arguing either for a non-factualism about analyticity (1) ... Or, at the very least, for an error thesis about it: (2) ... These attributions — including the stronger non-factualist thesis — seem licensed by many passages, including the famous one which concludes Quine's discussion in "Two Dogmas" ... Nevertheless, Paul Horwich does not wish to read Quine as endorsing either (1) or (2). He certainly does not wish to attribute (1) to him. And he wishes to attribute only a restricted version of (2). What this restriction is and why Paul wants to make it are matters I'll come to in just a moment.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 76,168

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
66 (#182,926)

6 months
2 (#297,430)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Paul Boghossian
New York University

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references