Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for Climate Change Policy?

The Monist 94 (3):329-348 (2011)
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Abstract

The precautionary approach has been widely considered reasonable for many issues in environmental policy, including climate change. It has also been recognized, however, that standard formulations of the precautionary principle suffer from many difficulties. An influential strategy to avoid these difficulties is to formulate a narrow version of the principle on the basis of the maximin rule. Rawls proposed that following the maximin rule can be rational under certain conditions. Defenders of this strategy argue that these conditions are approximated when it comes to issues like climate change. In the first part of this paper, I argue that the Rawlsian conditions do not establish the unique rationality of the maximin rule, hence the precautionary principle cannot be defended on its basis. When the Rawlsian conditions are approximated, other principles can also lead to reasonable choices. In particular, a prioritarian principle can capture the precautionary approach and serve a useful role in climate change policy. I develop this proposal in the second part.

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Greg Bognar
Stockholm University

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