Journal of Philosophy 105 (9):472-500 (2008)
AbstractAccording to a very natural picture of rational belief, we aim to believe only what is true. However, as Bernard Williams used to say, the world does not just inscribe itself onto our minds. Rather, we have to try to figure out what is true from the evidence available to us. To do this, we rely on a set of epistemic rules that tell us in some general way what it would be most rational to believe under various epistemic circumstances. We reason about what to believe; and we do so by relying on a set of rules....
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