Oxford University Press (2006)

Authors
Paul Boghossian
New York University
Abstract
Relativist and constructivist conceptions of knowledge have become orthodoxy in vast stretches of the academic world in recent times. This book critically examines such views and argues that they are fundamentally flawed. The book focuses on three different ways of reading the claim that knowledge is socially constructed, one about facts and two about justification. All three are rejected. The intuitive, common sense view is that there is a way things are that is independent of human opinion, and that we are capable of arriving at belief about how things are that is objectively reasonable, and is binding on anyone capable of appreciating the relevant evidence, regardless of their social or cultural perspective. Difficult as these notions may be, it is a mistake to think that recent philosophy has uncovered powerful reasons for rejecting them.
Keywords Knowledge, Theory of  Relativity  Objectivity  Constructivism (Philosophy
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Reprint years 2007
Buy this book $20.74 new (48% off)   $22.35 used (44% off)   Amazon page
Call number BD221.B64 2006
ISBN(s) 019928718X   0199230412   9780199230419   9780199287185
DOI 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2009.01199.x
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Extended Rationality: A Hinge Epistemology.Annalisa Coliva - 2015 - London, England: Palgrave-Macmillan.
Relativism.Maria Baghramian & Adam J. Carter - 2020 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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