Mental attitudes and common sense psychology: The case against elimination

Noûs 22 (3):369-398 (1988)
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Abstract

Aside from brute force, there are several philosophically respectable ways of eliminating the mental. In recent years the most popular elimination strategy has been directed against our common sense or folk psychological understanding of the mental. The strategy goes by the name of eliminative materialism (or eliminativism, in short). The motivation behind this strategy seems to be the following. If common sense psychology can be construed as the principled theory of the mental, whose vocabulary and principles implicitly define what counts as mental, then eliminating the theory is eliminating its subject matter. If the theory is shown to be false, then its subject matter does not exist. If, in other words, common sense psychology can be shown to describe and explain nothing real in human cognition, then the mental itself is a fiction

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References found in this work

Knowledge and the flow of information.F. Dretske - 1989 - Trans/Form/Ação 12:133-139.
Brainstorms.Daniel Dennett - 1978 - Philosophy of Science 47 (2):326-327.
Knowledge and the Flow of Information.Fred I. Dretske - 1981 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 175 (1):69-70.

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