Ethics 126 (3):636-661 (2016)
Authors |
|
Abstract |
Do the facts of evolution generate an epistemic challenge to moral realism? Some think so, and many “evolutionary debunking arguments” have been discussed in the recent literature. But they are all murky right where it counts most: exactly which epistemic principle is meant to take us from evolutionary considerations to the skeptical conclusion? Here, I will identify several distinct species of evolutionary debunking argument in the literature, each one of which relies on a distinct epistemic principle. Drawing on recent work in epistemology, I will show that most of these initially plausible principles are false, spoiling the arguments that rely on them. And we will see that each argument threatens only one popular view of moral psychology: a “Representationalist” view on which our moral judgments rely crucially on a mental intermediary—e.g. a sentiment, gut reaction, or affect-laden intuition—delivered by our evolved moral faculty. In the end, only one evolutionary debunking argument remains a menace: an “ Argument from Symmetry ” that I will introduce to the literature. But we will see that it should worry only all naturalists, pressuring them into a trilemma: give up moral realism, accept a rationalism that is incongruous with naturalism, or give up naturalism. Non-naturalists are free and clear.
|
Keywords | Ethics Evolutionary Debunking Arguments Epistemology Moral Skepticism Moral Realism Naturalism Philosophy of Religion Moral Epistemology Moral Psychology |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
Reprint years | 2016 |
DOI | 10.1086/684711 |
Options |
![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Download options
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Modal Security.Justin Clarke-Doane & Dan Baras - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (1):162-183.
Debunking Morality: Lessons From the EAAN Literature.Andrew Moon - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):208-226.
A Debunking Explanation for Moral Progress.Nathan Cofnas - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3171-3191.
View all 33 citations / Add more citations
Similar books and articles
Evolutionary Debunking Arguments: Moral Realism, Constructivism, and Explaining Moral Knowledge.Elizabeth Tropman - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (2):126-140.
Nativism and the Evolutionary Debunking of Morality.Brendan Cline - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (2):231-253.
Evolutionary Debunking of Morality: Epistemological or Metaphysical?Ramon Das - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (2):417-435.
Evolutionary Debunking, Moral Realism and Moral Knowledge.Russ Shafer-Landau - 2012 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 7 (1):1-38.
Debunking Evolutionary Debunking of Ethical Realism.William J. FitzPatrick - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (4):883-904.
Evolutionary Debunking Arguments and the Reliability of Moral Cognition.Ben Fraser - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (2):457-473.
Evolutionary Debunking Arguments and the Proximate/Ultimate Distinction.Andreas L. Mogensen - 2015 - Analysis 75 (2):196-203.
Evolution, Naturalism, and the Worthwhile: A Critique of Richard Joyce's Evolutionary Debunking of Morality.Christopher Toner - 2011 - Metaphilosophy 42 (4):520-546.
Darwinian Normative Skepticism.Dustin Locke - 2014 - In Michael Bergmann & Patrick Kain (eds.), Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief: Disagreement and Evolution. Oxford University Press.
A Peircean Response to the Evolutionary Debunking of Moral Knowledge.Gary Slater - 2014 - Zygon 49 (3):593-611.
Analytics
Added to PP index
2015-06-05
Total views
1,642 ( #3,004 of 2,506,520 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
360 ( #1,226 of 2,506,520 )
2015-06-05
Total views
1,642 ( #3,004 of 2,506,520 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
360 ( #1,226 of 2,506,520 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads