The architectural nonchalance of commonsense psychology

Mind and Language 8 (2):189-205 (1993)
Eliminativism assumes that commonsense psychology describes and explains the mind in terms of the internal design and operation of the mind. If this assumption is invalidated, so is eliminativism. The same conditional is true of intentional realism. Elsewhere (Bogdan 1991) I have argued against this 'folk- theory-theory' assumption by showing that commonsense psychology is not an empirical prototheory of the mind but a biosocially motivated practice of coding, utilizing, and sharing information from and about conspecifics. Here, without presupposing a specific analysis of commonsense psychology, I want to challenge a key implication of the 'folk-theory-theory' assumption to the effect that commonsense psychology is committed to a definite architecture of the mind
Keywords Cognition  Eliminativism  Folk Psychology  Metaphysics  Proposition
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0017.1993.tb00279.x
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Citations of this work BETA
J. van Brakel (1995). Interpreting Self-Ascriptions. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):393.
Radu J. Bogdan (1995). The Epistemological Illusion. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):390.

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