Abstract
Quality of life research aims to develop and apply indices for the
measurement of human welfare. It is an increasingly important
field within the social sciences and its results are an important
resource for policy making and evaluation. This paper explores
the conceptual background of quality of life research. It focuses
on its single most important issue: the controversy between the
use of ``objective social indicators'' and the use of people's
``subjective evaluations'' as proxies for welfare. Most quality
of life researchers today argue that people's own evaluations have
an indispensable role in quality of life measurement. I argue
that their position must be defended on philosophical grounds,
because their use of evaluations commits them to some particular
theories of welfare. I explore the connections between theories
of welfare in philosophy and the use of evaluations in quality of
life research. I conclude that even though evaluations may have a
role in particular applications, they are unlikely to have a role
in all applications.