The status of content

Philosophical Review 99 (2):157-84 (1990)
A n irrealist conception of a given region of discourse is the view that no real properties answer to the central predicates of the region in question. Any such conception emerges, invariably, as the result of the interaction of two forces. An account of the meaning of the central predicates, along with a conception of the sorts of property the world may contain, conspire to show that, if the predicates of the region are taken to express properties, their extensions would have to be deemed uniformly empty. The question then becomes whether the predicates are best understood as expressing properties, and hence as founded on error, or whether they ought to be understood along non-factualist lines.z Historically, irrealist models were developed primarily in connection with evaluative discourse, although as physicalism has flourished and as reductionist programs have failed, their application has been extended to many other domains. Indeed, it is one of the more influential suggestions in contemporary philosophy of mind that they apply even to ordinary belief/desire psychology. A correct understanding of the semantics and metaphysics of content-based psychology leaves us, so the proponents of the in-
Keywords Content  Metaphysics  Psychology  Realism
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.2307/2185488
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 24,422
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Tamás Demeter (2009). Two Kinds of Mental Realism. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 40 (1):59-71.
Jamin Asay (2014). Against Truth. Erkenntnis 79 (1):147-164.
Nick Zangwill (2009). Normativity and the Metaphysics of Mind. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):1–19.
Laura Schroeter (2007). Illusion of Transparency. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (4):597 – 618.

View all 37 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

204 ( #17,878 of 1,924,955 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

12 ( #67,347 of 1,924,955 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.