The status of content revisited

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 71 (December):264-278 (1990)
  Copy   BIBTEX


This paper argues that Devitt’s arguments in "Transcendentalism About Content" don’t show how to answer the challenge I laid down in "Status Of Content". I proceed as follows. I begin by looking at why I didn’t formulate content eliminativism in the way that Devitt does, and why I did formulate it as the thesis of “content irrealism.” I then show in detail why his criticisms are off-target.



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 76,297

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles


Added to PP

13 (#767,927)

6 months
2 (#298,943)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Paul Boghossian
New York University

Citations of this work

Eliminative materialism.William Ramsey - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Unreasonable Cartesian Doubt.David Alexander - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (2):503-522.
Pain is Mechanism.Simon van Rysewyk - 2013 - Dissertation, University of Tasmania
How not to refute eliminative materialism.Kenneth A. Taylor - 1994 - Philosophical Psychology 7 (1):101-125.

View all 11 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references