Why self-ascriptions are difficult and develop late

In Bertram F. Malle & Sara D. Hodges (eds.), Other Minds: How Humans Bridge the Gap Between Self and Others. Guilford. pp. 190--206 (2005)
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Abstract

Many philosophers and a few psychologists think that we understand our own minds before we understand those of others. Most developmental psychologists think that children understand their own minds at about the same time they understand other minds, by using the same cognitive abilities. I disagree with both views. I think that children understand other minds before they understand their own. Their self-understanding depends on some cognitive abilities that develop later than, and independently of, the abilities involved in understanding other minds. This is the general theme of this chapter

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