Communication by Ramsey-sentence clause

Philosophy of Science 34 (4):341-347 (1967)
F. P. Ramsey pointed out in Theories that the observational content of a theory expressed partly in non-observational terms is retained in the sentence resulting from existentially generalizing the conjunction of all sentences of the theory with respect to all nonobservational terms. Such terms are thus avoidable in principle, but only at the cost of forming a single "monolithic" sentence. This paper suggests that communication may be thought of as occurring not only by sentence but by clause, a sentential formula closed except for a special kind of variable. Understanding such clauses requires incorporating them within the scope of one's own Ramsey sentence. Many concepts of deductive and inductive logic carry over without great change. But the concepts of truth and designation are extendible to clauses only in the sense that assertions involving them must, to be understood, in turn be construed as clauses and incorporated into the Ramsey sentence. The behavior of these extended concepts of truth and designation suggests an explication of coherence truth within a correspondence-truth framework
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DOI 10.1086/288172
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Truth, Ramsification, and the Pluralist's Revenge.Cory Wright - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (2):265-283.
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