Authors
Abstract
Robert Pippin's masterful account of rational agency in Hegel emphasizes important dimensions of freedom and independence, where putative independence is always bound up with a profound dependence on others. This insistence on the complex relationships between freedom, dependence and independence raise an important question that Pippin does not consider: is Hegel a republican? This is especially significant given the fact that modern republicanism has explored this same conceptual terrain. I argue that a form of republicanism is in fact an important aspect of Hegel's theory of freedom, and this should lead us to moderate Pippin's account of the conservative side of Hegel's conception of social dependence. These affinities mean that even if Hegel does not fully endorse contemporary versions of republicanism (such as that of Philip Pettit), he shares core features of the republican view of domination and freedom. In fact, Hegel is a republican to the extent that he shares what Pippin calls ?that noble nineteenth century idea that my freedom depends upon the freedom of others?. Or, to put it in a more directly republican way typical of the eighteenth century, the freedom of each is dependent upon the freedom of all and thus freedom exists only if it is shared. As developed by Pippin, Hegel's conception of shared freedom is inadequate to the extent that it cannot give a full account of the possibilities of domination and dependence in modern institutions, I illustrate this difficulty through examples taken from Hegel's Philosophy of Right, including marriage, markets, and political deliberation.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2011
DOI 10.1080/0020174X.2010.516676
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 58,981
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Hegel’s Practical Philosophy.Robert Pippin - 2008 - Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 31 (2):423-441.
Depoliticizing Democracy.Philip Pettit - 2004 - Ratio Juris 17 (1):52-65.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Broader Contexts of Non-Domination: Pettit and Hegel on Freedom and Recognition.Arto Laitinen - 2015 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 18 (4):390-406.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Non-Domination as a Moral Ideal.Christian Nadeau - 2003 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 6 (1):120-134.
Recognition Within the Limits of Reason: Remarks on Pippin's Hegel's Practical Philosophy.David Ingram - 2010 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 53 (5):470-489.
A Note on List's Modal Logic of Republican Freedom.Boudewijn de Bruin - 2008 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 7 (3):341-349.
Republicanism and Geopolitical Domination.Mark Rigstad - 2011 - Journal of Political Power 4 (2):279-300.
Dominating Nature.Jason Brennan - 2007 - Environmental Values 16 (4):513-528.
Republican Freedom, Rights, and the Coalition Problem.Keith Dowding - 2011 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 10 (3):301-322.
Fichte and Hegel on Recognition.James Alexander Clarke - 2009 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 17 (2):365-385.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2010-09-24

Total views
73 ( #140,304 of 2,427,422 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #339,671 of 2,427,422 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes