Philosophical Explorations 17 (2):203-222 (2014)
Authors |
|
Abstract |
The theory of mind (ToM) framework has been criticised by emerging alternative accounts. Each alternative begins with the accusation that ToM's validity as a research paradigm rests on the assumption of the ‘unobservability’ of other minds. We argue that the critics' discussion of the unobservability assumption (UA) targets a straw man. We discuss metaphysical, phenomenological, epistemological, and psychological readings of UA and demonstrate that it is not the case that ToM assumes the metaphysical, phenomenological, or epistemological claims. However, ToM supports the psychological UA as a claim about cognitive processes responsible for mindreading. The latter can be interpreted as a claim that (a) neither the other's ‘mindedness’ in general nor the other's particular mental states are observable (i.e. apprehended perceptually); (b) particular mental states are unobservable, whereas some aspects indicative of ‘mindedness’ are observable; (c) some mental states are unobservable but some are also observable. Whereas the critics tend to attribute (a) to ToM, most ToM accounts actually take positions (b) or (c). We conclude that the allegations against ToM for positing UA are seriously misdirected. We further bring out an important stipulation of any account of observability of mental states: mental states are not observable in the same way as the sensory properties of physical objects.
|
Keywords | social cognition mindreading theory of mind perception |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
Reprint years | 2014 |
ISBN(s) | |
DOI | 10.1080/13869795.2013.821515 |
Options |
![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Download options
References found in this work BETA
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas Samuel Kuhn - 1962 - Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Does the Chimpanzee Have a Theory of Mind?David Premack & G. Woodruff - 1978 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (4):515-629.
View all 59 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
Social Constraints on the Direct Perception of Emotions and Intentions.Shaun Gallagher & Somogy Varga - 2014 - Topoi 33 (1):185-199.
The Felt Presence of Other Minds: Predictive Processing, Counterfactual Predictions, and Mentalising in Autism.Colin J. Palmer, Anil K. Seth & Jakob Hohwy - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 36:376-389.
The New Hybrids: Continuing Debates on Social Perception.Shaun Gallagher - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 36:452-465.
Perception and the Problem of Access to Other Minds.Nivedita Gangopadhyay & Katsunori Miyahara - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology (5):1-20.
View all 17 citations / Add more citations
Similar books and articles
Theory-Theory and the Direct Perception of Mental States.Jane Suilin Lavelle - 2012 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (2):213-230.
Folk Psychological and Phenomenological Accounts of Social Perception.Mitchell Herschbach - 2008 - Philosophical Explorations 11 (3):223 – 235.
Rethinking the Ontogeny of Mindreading.Maurizio Tirassa, Francesca M. Bosco & Livia Colle - 2006 - Consciousness and Cognition 15 (1):197-217.
The Phenomenology of Person Perception.Joel Krueger - 2014 - In Mark Bruhn & Donald Wehrs (eds.), Neuroscience, Literature, and History. Routledge. pp. 153-173.
Animal Rights, Animal Minds, and Human Mindreading.Matteo Mameli & Lisa Bortolotti - 2006 - Journal of Medical Ethics 32 (2):84-89.
Folk Theory of Mind: Conceptual Foundations of Human Social Cognition.Bertram F. Malle - 2005 - In Ran R. Hassin, James S. Uleman & John A. Bargh (eds.), The New Unconscious. Oxford Series in Social Cognition and Social Neuroscience. Oxford University Press. pp. 225-255.
How to Read Your Own Mind: A Cognitive Theory of Self-Consciousness.Shaun Nichols & Stephen Stich - unknown
Seeing Subjectivity: Defending a Perceptual Account of Other Minds.Joel Krueger & Søren Overgaard - 2012 - ProtoSociology (47):239-262.
The Semantic Problem(s) with Research on Animal Mind‐Reading.Cameron Buckner - 2014 - Mind and Language 29 (5):566-589.
Embodiment and the Perceptual Hypothesis.William E. S. McNeill - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (247):569 - 591.
Analytics
Added to PP index
2013-07-30
Total views
98 ( #120,728 of 2,518,720 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #205,867 of 2,518,720 )
2013-07-30
Total views
98 ( #120,728 of 2,518,720 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #205,867 of 2,518,720 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads