Acta Analytica 19 (33):55-63 (2004)
Arithmetical self-reference through diagonalization is compared with self-recognition in a mirror, in a series of diagrams that show the structure and main stages of construction of self-referential sentences. A Gödel code is compared with a mirror, Gödel numbers with mirror images, numerical reference to arithmetical formulas with using a mirror to see things indirectly, self-reference with looking at one’s own image, and arithmetical provability of self-reference with recognition of the mirror image. The comparison turns arithmetical self-reference into an idealized model of self-recognition and the conception(s) of self based on that capacity.
|Keywords||Gödel code mirroring diagonalization self-reference self-recognition|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Computability and Logic.George Boolos, John Burgess, Richard P. & C. Jeffrey - 2007 - Cambridge University Press.
Languages in Which Self Reference is Possible.Raymond M. Smullyan - 1957 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 22 (1):55-67.
Consciousness as Self-Function.Donald R. Perlis - 1997 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (4-5):509-25.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Arithmetical Completeness Versus Relative Completeness.Michal Grabowski - 1988 - Studia Logica 47 (3):213 - 220.
Predicate Provability Logic with Non-Modalized Quantifiers.Giorgie Dzhaparidze - 1991 - Studia Logica 50 (1):149 - 160.
Modal Analysis of Generalized Rosser Sentences.Vítězslav Švejdar - 1983 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 48 (4):986-999.
Knowledge of Arithmetic.C. S. Jenkins - 2005 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (4):727-747.
Provability Logics for Natural Turing Progressions of Arithmetical Theories.L. D. Beklemishev - 1991 - Studia Logica 50 (1):107 - 128.
Arithmetical Interpretations of Dynamic Logic.Petr Hájek - 1983 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 48 (3):704-713.
The Priority of Arithmetical Truth Over Arithmetical Provability.Enrico Martino - 2002 - Topoi 21 (1-2):55-63.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads35 ( #148,660 of 2,177,988 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #166,811 of 2,177,988 )
How can I increase my downloads?