Biology and Philosophy 16 (3):339-356 (2001)
The view that moral cognition is subserved by a two-tieredarchitecture is defended: Moral reasoning is the result both ofspecialized, informationally encapsulated modules which automaticallyand effortlessly generate intuitions; and of general-purpose,cognitively penetrable mechanisms which enable moral judgment in thelight of the agent's general fund of knowledge. This view is contrastedwith rival architectures of social/moral cognition, such as Cosmidesand Tooby's view that the mind is wholly modular, and it is argued thata two-tiered architecture is more plausible.
|Keywords||ambivalence attitude cognitive architecture cognitively penetrable inclusive fitness informationally encapsulated mental faculty module moral intuition moral judgment repression strength of attitude teleological|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Is the Emotional Dog Wagging its Rational Tail, or Chasing It?Cordelia Fine - 2006 - Philosophical Explorations 9 (1):83 – 98.
Moral Reasoning: Hints and Allegations.Joseph M. Paxton & Joshua D. Greene - 2010 - Topics in Cognitive Science 2 (3):511-527.
Moral Reasoning.Gilbert Harman, Kelby Mason & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2010 - In John Michael Doris (ed.), The Moral Psychology Handbook. Oxford University Press.
Ethical Embodiment and Moral Reasoning: A Challenge to Peter Singer.Rachel Tillman - 2013 - Hypatia 28 (1):18-31.
A Social Model of Moral Dumbfounding: Implications for Studying Moral Reasoning and Moral Judgment.Andrew Sneddon - 2007 - Philosophical Psychology 20 (6):731 – 748.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads28 ( #180,990 of 2,158,685 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #193,668 of 2,158,685 )
How can I increase my downloads?