Revisiting the Right to Do Wrong

Authors
Renee Bolinger
Australian National University
Abstract
Rights to do wrong are not necessary even within the framework of interest-based rights aimed at preserving autonomy. Agents can make morally significant choices and develop their moral character without a right to do wrong, so long as we allow that there can be moral variation within the set of actions that an agent is permitted to perform. Agents can also engage in non-trivial self-constitution in choosing between morally indifferent options, so long as there is adequate non-moral variation among the alternatives. The stubborn intuition that individuals have a right to do wrong in some cases can be explained as stemming from a cautionary principle motivated by the asymmetry between the risk of wrongly interfering and that of refraining from interfering.
Keywords right to do wrong  waldron
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Reprint years 2017
DOI 10.1080/00048402.2016.1179654
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References found in this work BETA

A Right to Do Wrong.Jeremy Waldron - 1981 - Ethics 92 (1):21-39.
Defending the Right To Do Wrong.Ori J. Herstein - 2012 - Law and Philosophy 31 (3):343-365.

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