Two asymmetries governing neural and mental timing

Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):265-272 (2002)
Abstract
Mental timing studies may be influenced by powerful cognitive illusions that can produce an asymmetry in their rate of progress relative to neuronal timing studies. Both types of timing research are also governed by a temporal asymmetry, expressed by the fact that the direction of causation must follow time's arrow. Here we refresh our earlier suggestion that the temporal asymmetry offers promise as a means of timing mental activities. We update our earlier analysis of Libet's data within this framework. Then we consider the surprises which often occur on those rare occasions when neural timing experiments parallel mental timing work exactly. Together, these surprises and asymmetries prescribe a relentlessly meticulous and fully transparent exposition of timing methods, terms, and concepts which shuns plausible narratives, even when buttressed by rigorous formal models, unless guided by apposite empirical evidence
Keywords *Consciousness States  *Data Collection  *Perception  *Physiological Correlates  *Time Series
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DOI 10.1006/ccog.2002.0561
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References found in this work BETA
Absolute Timing of Mental Activities.Gerald S. Wasserman & King-Leung Kong - 1979 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 2 (2):243-255.

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Citations of this work BETA
Libet's Timing of Mental Events: Commentary on the Commentaries.Stanley Klein - 2002 - Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):326-333.
On Timing Relations Between Brain and World.William P. Banks - 2002 - Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):141-143.

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