The rational impermissibility of accepting racial generalizations

Synthese:1-17 (forthcoming)

Authors
Renee Bolinger
Australian National University
Abstract
I argue that inferences from highly probabilifying racial generalizations are not solely objectionable because acting on such inferences would be problematic, or they violate a moral norm, but because they violate a distinctively epistemic norm. They involve accepting a proposition when, given the costs of a mistake, one is not adequately justified in doing so. First I sketch an account of the nature of adequate justification—practical adequacy with respect to eliminating the ~p possibilities from one’s epistemic statespace. Second, I argue that inferences based on demographic generalizations tend to disproportionately expose group members to the risks associated with mistakenly assuming stereotypical propositions, and so magnify the wrong involved in relying on such inferences without adequate justification.
Keywords rational inference  generalizations  race  acceptance  practical adequacy  moral encroachment  pragmatic encroachment  belief
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-018-1809-5
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References found in this work BETA

Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment1.Jacob Ross & Mark Schroeder - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):259-288.
Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.
Belief, Credence, and Norms.Lara Buchak - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (2):1-27.
What Else Justification Could Be.Martin Smith - 2010 - Noûs 44 (1):10 - 31.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Wrongs of Racist Beliefs.Rima Basu - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-19.
What We Epistemically Owe To Each Other.Rima Basu - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (4):915–931.
VIII—Moral Encroachment.Sarah Moss - 2018 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 118 (2):177-205.

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