Philosophical Perspectives 34 (1):5-26 (2020)

Authors
Renee Jorgensen
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
Abstract
Several authors have recently suggested that moral factors and norms `encroach' on the epistemic, and because of salient parallels to pragmatic encroachment views in epistemology, these suggestions have been dubbed `moral encroachment views'. This paper distinguishes between variants of the moral encroachment thesis, pointing out how they address different problems, are motivated by different considerations, and are not all subject to the same objections. It also explores how the family of moral encroachment views compare to classical pragmatic encroachment accounts.
Keywords generalization  justified belief  moral encroachment  pragmatic encroachment
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DOI 10.1111/phpe.12124
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References found in this work BETA

The Wrongs of Racist Beliefs.Rima Basu - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2497-2515.
Knowledge and Action.John Hawthorne & Jason Stanley - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):571-590.
Belief, Credence, and Norms.Lara Buchak - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (2):1-27.
What We Epistemically Owe To Each Other.Rima Basu - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (4):915–931.

View all 39 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

A Tale of Two Doctrines: Moral Encroachment and Doxastic Wronging.Rima Basu - 2021 - In Jennifer Lackey (ed.), Applied Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 99-118.
There is No Such Thing as Doxastic Wrongdoing.David Enoch & Levi Spectre - forthcoming - Philosophical Perspectives.

View all 15 citations / Add more citations

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