Noûs 32 (1):37-53 (1998)

Authors
Daniel Bonevac
University of Texas at Austin
Abstract
The crucial feature of obligation sentences to which the puzzles point is that such sentences, and evaluative sentences more generally, are defeasible. They may be warranted, given some information, only to be defeated by further information. A theory that recognizes this no longer needs to see conditional obligation as anything more than a simple combination of unary obligation and the conditional.
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DOI 10.1111/0029-4624.00086
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References found in this work BETA

Modal Logic: An Introduction.Brian F. Chellas - 1980 - Cambridge University Press.
Counterfactuals. [REVIEW]William Parry - 1973 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 44 (2):278-281.
Deontic Logic.G. H. von Wright - 1951 - Mind 60 (237):1-15.
I. Deontic Logic.G. H. von Wright - 1951 - Mind 60 (237):1-15.

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Citations of this work BETA

Deontic Logic.Paul McNamara - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Dynamic Thoughts on Ifs and Oughts.Malte Willer - 2014 - Philosophers' Imprint 14:1-30.
Desire Considered as a Propositional Attitude.William G. Lycan - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):201-215.

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