Cambridge University Press (1998)
| Abstract |
A comprehensive defence of the rationalist view that insight independent of experience is a genuine basis for knowledge.
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| ISBN(s) | 0521592364 |
| DOI | 10.2307/3071165 |
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Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism.Michael Huemer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):30–55.
Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions.Selim Berker - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (3):337-393.
Analytic Epistemology and Experimental Philosophy.Joshua Alexander & Jonathan M. Weinberg - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (1):56–80.
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