Topoi (forthcoming)

Patrick Bondy
Wichita State University
Interpersonal disagreement happens all the time. How to properly characterize interpersonal disagreement and how to respond to it are important problems, but that such disagreements exist is obvious. The existence of intrapersonal disagreement, however, is another matter. On the one hand, we do change our minds sometimes, especially when new evidence comes in, and so there is a clear enough sense in which we can be characterized as having disagreements with our past selves. But what about synchronic disagreements with ourselves? Are such cases possible, or is there something about the nature of belief that rules out the possibility of knowingly holding beliefs which cannot be rationally held at the same time? In this paper, I argue that there can be cases of intrapersonal synchronic disagreement, and that such disagreements can be deep, in the same way that interpersonal disagreements can be deep. For intrapersonal disagreements, just like interpersonal disagreements, can be grounded in conflicting frameworks for interpreting and reasoning about the world. I also argue that synchronic intrapersonal disagreements are peer disagreements. The paper ends with a discussion of four possible responses to interpersonal deep disagreements, concluding that if those responses are sometimes rational responses in the interpersonal case, then they are also sometimes rational responses in the intrapersonal case.
Keywords Disagreement  Deep disagreement  Justification  Coliva  Belief
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11245-020-09707-0
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 50,488
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Epistemological Puzzles About Disagreement.Richard Feldman - 2006 - In Stephen Hetherington (ed.), Epistemology Futures. Oxford University Press. pp. 216-236.
The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement.Tom Kelly - 2005 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 1.
Disagreement: What’s the Problem? Or A Good Peer is Hard to Find.Nathan L. King - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):249-272.
Personal Identity.Derek Parfit - 1971 - Philosophical Review 80 (January):3-27.
Merely Verbal Disputes.C. S. I. Jenkins - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S1):11-30.

View all 29 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Wittgenstein and the Logic of Deep Disagreement.David Godden & William H. Brenner - 2010 - Cogency: Journal of Reasoning and Argumentation 2:41-80.
The Methodological Usefulness of Deep Disagreement.Steven W. Patterson - 2015 - Cogency: Journal of Reasoning and Argumentation 6 (2).
Arrogance and Deep Disagreement.Andrew Aberdein - forthcoming - In Alessandra Tanesini & Michael Lynch (eds.), Polarisation, Arrogance, and Dogmatism: Philosophical Perspectives. London: Routledge. pp. 39-52.
Wittgenstein and Deep Disagreement.Ranalli Chris - 2017 - The Philosophers' Magazine 79:50-55.
Self-Exempting Conciliationism is Arbitrary.Simon Blessenohl - 2015 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 29 (3):1-22.
Disagreement: Idealized and Everyday.Jonathan Matheson - 2014 - In Jonathan Matheson Rico Vitz (ed.), The Ethics of Belief: Individual and Social. Oxford University Press. pp. 315-330.


Added to PP index

Total views
6 ( #1,025,621 of 2,326,762 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
6 ( #128,611 of 2,326,762 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes