Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge

Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1):53-73 (1980)
One of the many problems that would have t o be solved by a satisfactory theory of empirical knowledge, perhaps the most central is a general structural problem which I shall call the epistemic regress problem: the problem of how to avoid an in- finite and presumably vicious regress of justification in ones account of the justifica- tion of empirical beliefs. Foundationalist theories of empirical knowledge, as we shall see further below, attempt t o avoid the regress by locating a class of empirical beliefs whose justification does not depend on that of other empirical beliefs. Extemalist theories, the topic of the present paper, represent one species of foundationalism.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1475-4975.1980.tb00396.x
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Epistemic Entitlement.Peter J. Graham - 2012 - Noûs 46 (3):449-482.
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The Ontology of Epistemic Reasons.John Turri - 2009 - Noûs 43 (3):490-512.
Evidentialist Reliabilism.Juan Comesaña - 2010 - Noûs 44 (4):571-600.
Unreasonable Knowledge.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):1-21.

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