Abstract
It is fairly standard in accounts of the epistemology of perceptual knowledge to distinguish three main alternative positions: representationalism, phenomenalism, and a third view that is called either naïve realism or direct realism. I have always found the last of these views puzzling and elusive. My aim in this paper is to try to figure out what direct realism amounts to, mainly with an eye to seeing whether it offers a genuine epistemological alternative to the other two views and to representationalism in particular. My main thesis will be that it does not—that what is right in direct realist views turns out to have little bearing on the central epistemological issue concerning perceptual knowledge.
Keywords Direct Realism  Epistemology  Knowledge  Perception  Representationalism
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DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2004.tb00398.x
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Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism.Michael Huemer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):30–55.
Phenomenal Conservatism.Luca Moretti - 2015 - Analysis 75 (2):296-309.
Seemings and the Possibility of Epistemic Justification.Matthew Skene - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):539-559.
Representationalism and the Argument From Hallucination.Brad J. Thompson - 2008 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (3):384-412.
Knowing Things in Themselves.M. Oreste Fiocco - 2017 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 94 (3):332-358.

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