Les avatars quiniens de l'analyticité

Archives de Philosophie 4 (4):549-562 (2008)
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Abstract

Quine est célèbre pour sa critique de la notion d’analyticité, mais il en a également proposé des substituts définissables en termes behavioristes. Cet article examine la question de savoir si de tels substituts peuvent ou non jouer un rôle épistémologique, en les comparant avec des tentatives récentes de réhabilitation de l’a priori. Il apparaît que la caractérisation de ce qu’est une définition acceptable en termes behavioristes est cruciale, et qu’un élargissement de la classe des comportements linguistiques pertinents peut ouvrir la voie à une réhabilitation substantielle de l’analyticité.Quine is famous for his critics against the notion of analyticity used in epistemology and philosophy of science by philosophers of the Vienna circle. However, Quine has also proposed alternative definitions of the notion, which would be acceptable from a behaviorist perspective. In this paper, I address the question whether such alternative definitions can play any epistemologically significant role, by comparing them with recent attempts at a new defense of a priori knowledge. The upshot is that the answer cruccially depends on what is an acceptable definition in a behaviorist perspective. It might well be that an epistemologically significant notion of analyticity can be based upon a broad enough characterization of linguistic behavior

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Denis Bonnay
Université Paris Nanterre

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Analyticity reconsidered.Paul Artin Boghossian - 1996 - Noûs 30 (3):360-391.
Truth by Convention.W. V. Quine - 1976 - In Willard Van Orman Quine (ed.), The ways of paradox, and other essays. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. pp. 90–124.
In defense of a dogma.H. P. Grice & P. F. Strawson - 1956 - Philosophical Review 65 (2):141-158.
In defense of a dogma.H. Paul Grice & P. F. Strawson - 2010 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Arguing about language. New York: Routledge. pp. 141 - 158.
Boghossian on analyticity.E. Margolis & S. Laurence - 2001 - Analysis 61 (4):293-302.

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