Memory and perfect recall in extensive games

Games and Economic Behavior 47 (2):237-256 (2004)
Abstract
The notion of perfect recall in extensive games was introduced by Kuhn (1953), who interpreted it as "equivalent to the assertion that each player is allowed by the rules of the game to remember everything he knew at previous moves and all of his choices at those moves''. We provide a characterization and axiomatization of perfect recall based on two notions of memory: (1) memory of past knowledge and (2) memory of past actions.
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Merging Frameworks for Interaction.van Benthem Johan, Gerbrandy Jelle, Hoshi Tomohiro & Pacuit Eric - 2009 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 38 (5):491-526.

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