Erkenntnis 59 (1):47 - 76 (2003)

Abstract
The connection between scientific knowledge and our empirical access to realityis not well explained within the structuralist approach to scientific theories. I arguethat this is due to the use of a semantics not rich enough from the philosophical pointof view. My proposal is to employ Sellars–Brandom's inferential semantics to understand how can scientific terms have empirical content, and Hintikka's game-theoretical semantics to analyse how can theories be empirically tested. The main conclusions are that scientific concepts gain their meaning through `basic theories' grounded on `common sense, and that scientific method usually allows the pragmatic verification and falsification of scientific theories.
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DOI 10.1023/A:1023911312629
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References found in this work BETA

Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind.Wilfrid S. Sellars - 1956 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1:253-329.
The Logic of Scientific Discovery.K. Popper - 1959 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 10 (37):55-57.
The logical structure of mathematical physics.C. A. Hooker - 1975 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 37 (1):151-152.

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