Logos and Episteme 11 (4):507-516 (2020)

Authors
Anna Boncompagni
University of California, Irvine
Abstract
In this commentary on Nuno Venturinha’s Description of Situations, after highlighting what in my view are the most significant and innovative features of his work, I focus on Venturinha’s infallibilist approach to knowledge. This topic allows for a wider discussion concerning the pragmatist aspects of the later Wittgenstein’s philosophy. I discuss this in three steps: first, by describing the general similarity between Wittgenstein and the pragmatists with respect to the emphasis on contexts; second, by focusing on the kind of fallibilism endorsed by the pragmatists and its compatibility with Charles S. Peirce’s concept of the “indubitables,” which I take as a precursor of Wittgenstein’s concept of hinges; and, finally, by advancing the hypothesis that it is possible to find a form of fallibilism in the later Wittgenstein too, notwithstanding his insistence on the impossibility of mistakes. My conclusion is that while Venturinha’s contextualism finds support in the later Wittgenstein’s writings, his infallibilism does not.
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  Philosophy of Mind
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DOI 10.5840/logos-episteme202011438
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