Players' information in extensive games

Mathematical Social Sciences 24 (1):35-48 (1992)
Abstract
This paper suggests a way of formalizing the amount of information that can be conveyed to each player along every possible play of an extensive game. The information given to each player i when the play of the game reaches node x is expressed as a subset of the set of terminal nodes. Two definitions are put forward, one expressing the minimum amount of information and the other the maximum amount of information that can be conveyed without violating the constraint represented by the information sets. Our definitions provide intuitive characterizations of such notions as perfect recall, perfect information and simultanetty.
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Rational Beliefs in Extensive Games.Giacomo Bonanno - 1992 - Theory and Decision 33 (2):153-176.

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