Cambridge University Press (1983)

Abstract
The relations between reason, motivation and value present problems which, though ancient, remain intractable. If values are objective and rational how can they move us and if they are dependent on our contingent desires how can they be rational? E. J. Bond makes a bold attack on this dilemma. The widespread view among philosophers today is that judgements contain an irreducible element of personal commitment. To this Professor Bond proposes an account of values as objective and value judgements as true or false, employing a distinction between grounding and motivating reasons to establish their connection with action. He defines and tests his position against a number of recent theories, providing in the process forceful criticism of Williams, Wiggins, Foot, Narveson and Nagel, among others. A distinctive contribution to the subject, it will stimulate interest and worthwhile debate among philosophers, while also serving as an introduction to this vital topic.
Keywords Values  Ethics
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Call number BD435.B548 1983
ISBN(s) 0521245710   9780521270793   0521270790   9780521245715
DOI 10.2307/2185438
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The Guise of the Good.J. David Velleman - 1992 - Noûs 26 (1):3 - 26.
The Scope of Instrumental Reason.Mark Schroeder - 2004 - Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):337–364.
How is Moral Disagreement a Problem for Realism?David Enoch - 2009 - The Journal of Ethics 13 (1):15-50.
Taking Something as a Reason for Action.Markus E. Schlosser - 2012 - Philosophical Papers 41 (2):267-304.

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