Rational beliefs in extensive games

Theory and Decision 33 (2):153-176 (1992)

Giacomo Bonanno
University of California, Davis
Abstract This article has no associated abstract. (fix it)
Keywords Information  beliefs  subgame-perfect equilibrium
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DOI 10.1007/BF00134094
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Players' Information in Extensive Games.Giacomo Bonanno - 1992 - Mathematical Social Sciences 24 (1):35-48.

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