Philosophy 53 (204):247 - 256 (1978)
Most of us believe that we are entitled to treat members of other species in ways which would be considered wrong if inflicted on members of our own species. We kill them for food, keep them confined, use them in painful experiments. The moral philosopher has to ask what relevant difference justifies this difference in treatment. A look at this question will lead us to re-examine the distinctions which we have assumed make a moral difference
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Cruel Nature: Harmfulness as an Important, Overlooked Dimension in Judgments of Moral Standing.Jared Piazza, Justin F. Landy & Geoffrey P. Goodwin - 2014 - Cognition 131 (1):108-124.
The Two Sources of Moral Standing.Justin Sytsma & Edouard Machery - 2012 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (3):303-324.
Clarifying the Concept of Cruelty: What Makes Cruelty to Animals Cruel.Julia Tanner - 2015 - Heythrop Journal 56 (5):818-835.
It Takes Two: Ethical Dualism in the Vegetative State.Carolyn Suchy-Dicey - 2009 - Neuroethics 2 (3):125-136.
Capacities, Context and the Moral Status of Animals.Sherri Irvin - 2004 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 21 (1):61–76.
Similar books and articles
Ferré: Organicistic Connectedness—But Still Speciesistic.Arthur Zucker - 1996 - Ethics and the Environment 1 (2):185 - 190.
The Relevance of Speciesism to Life Sciences Practices.Roger Wertheimer - 2007 - In Fred Adams (ed.), Journal of Philosophical Research. Philosophy Document Center. pp. 27-38.
What is Speciesism?Oscar Horta - 2010 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 23 (3):243-266.
Added to index2010-08-10
Total downloads111 ( #42,002 of 2,146,969 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #226,050 of 2,146,969 )
How can I increase my downloads?
There are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.