Semantic relationism, belief reports and contradiction

Philosophical Studies 166 (2):273-284 (2013)
In his book Semantic Relationism, Kit Fine propounds an original and sophisticated semantic theory called ‘semantic relationism’ or ‘relational semantics’, whose peculiarity is the enrichment of Kaplan’s, Salmon’s and Soames’ Russellian semantics (more specifically, the semantic content of simple sentences and the truth-conditions of belief reports) with coordination, “the very strongest relation of synonymy or being semantically the same”. In this paper, my goal is to shed light on an undesirable result of semantic relationism: a report like “Tom believes that Cicero is bald and Tom does not believe that Tully is bald” is correct according to Fine’s provided truth-conditions of belief reports, but its semantic content is (very likely) a contradiction. As I will argue in the paper, even the resort to the notion of token proposition, introduced in Fine’s recent article “Comments on Scott Soames’ ‘Coordination Problems’”, does not suffice to convincingly eliminate the contradiction; moreover, it raises new difficulties
Keywords Semantic relationism  Coordination  Token propositions  Belief reports  Contradiction
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-012-0017-2
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References found in this work BETA
Nathan Salmon (1989). Illogical Belief. Philosophical Perspectives 3:243-285.
Kit Fine (2010). Comments on Scott Soames''Coordination Problems'. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (2):475-484.

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Citations of this work BETA
Richard G. Heck (2014). In Defense of Formal Relationism. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (3):243-250.

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Kent Bach (1997). Do Belief Reports Report Beliefs? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78 (3):215-241.
Emar Maier (2005). De Re and de Se in Quantified Belief Reports. In Sylvia Blaho, Luis Vicente & Erik Schoorlemmer (eds.), Proceedings of Console Xiii. pp. 211-29.

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