Sellars vs. the given

Daniel Bonevac
University of Texas at Austin
John McDowell, Richard Rorty, and Robert Brandom invoke Sellars’s arguments against the Myth of the Given as having shown that the Given is nothing more than a myth. But most of Sellars’s arguments attack logical atomism, not the framework of givenness as such. Moreover, they do not succeed. At crucial points the arguments confuse the perspectives of a knower and those attributing knowledge to a knower. Only one argument-the “inconsistent triad” argument-addresses the Myth of the Given as such, and there are several ways of escaping its conclusion. Invocations of Sellars’s refutation of the Myth of the Given are empty
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  Philosophy of Mind
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s) 0031-8205
DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2002.tb00140.x
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 40,164
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Mind and World.John McDowell - 1994 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Science, Perception and Reality.Wilfrid Sellars - 1963 - New York: Humanities Press.

View all 17 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Looks as Powers.Philip Pettit - 2003 - Philosophical Issues 13 (1):221-52.
Situating Experience: Agency, Perception, and the Given.Matthew Burstein - 2006 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (1):1-29.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles


Added to PP index

Total views
146 ( #47,719 of 2,237,323 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
6 ( #307,030 of 2,237,323 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes

Sign in to use this feature