Informal Logic 30 (2):142-158 (2010)
The aim of this paper is to defend the claim that arguments are truth-directed, and to discuss the role that truth plays in the evaluation of arguments that are truth-directed. It concludes that the proper place of truth is in the metatheory in terms of which a theory of evaluation is to be worked out, rather than in the theory of evaluation itself as a constraint on premise adequacy.
|Keywords||Premise adequacy Truth Acceptability|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
The Minimalist Theory of Truth: Challenges and Concerns.Glen Hoffmann - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (10):938-949.
A Proposal for a Non-Realist Theory of Truth.María Ponte Azcárate - 2007 - The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 6:105-109.
From Contexts to Circumstances of Evaluation: Is the Trade-Off Always Innocuous?Mikhail Kissine - 2012 - Synthese 184 (2):199-216.
Toward a Geometrical Theory of Truth Approximation: Reply to Thomas Mormann.Theo A. F. Kuipers - 2005 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 83 (1):455-457.
More on Warrant's Entailing Truth.Trenton Merricks - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (3):627-631.
Added to index2011-01-28
Total downloads35 ( #146,142 of 2,164,545 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #347,971 of 2,164,545 )
How can I increase my downloads?