Truth and Argument Evaluation

Informal Logic 30 (2):142-158 (2010)
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to defend the claim that arguments are truth-directed, and to discuss the role that truth plays in the evaluation of arguments that are truth-directed. It concludes that the proper place of truth is in the metatheory in terms of which a theory of evaluation is to be worked out, rather than in the theory of evaluation itself as a constraint on premise adequacy.
Keywords Premise adequacy  Truth  Acceptability
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