Two dogmas of empiricism 1a

Authors
Daniel Bonevac
University of Texas at Austin
Abstract
Modern empiricism has been conditioned in large part by two dogmas. One is a belief in some fundamental cleavage between truths which are analytic, or grounded in meanings independently of matters of fact and truths which are synthetic, or grounded in fact. The other dogma is reductionism: the belief that each meaningful statement is equivalent to some logical construct upon terms which refer to immediate experience. Both dogmas, I shall argue, are ill founded. One effect of abandoning them is, as we shall see, a blurring of the supposed boundary between speculative metaphysics and natural science. Another effect is a shift toward pragmatism
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 34,507
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

F/Actual Knowing: Putting Facts and Values in Place.Holmes Rolston - 2005 - Ethics and the Environment 10 (2):137-174.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
72 ( #86,854 of 2,268,147 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #373,366 of 2,268,147 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature