Tonk Strikes Back

Australasian Journal of Logic 3:33-44 (2005)
  Copy   BIBTEX


What is a logical constant? In which terms should we characterize the meaning of logical words like “and”, “or”, “implies”? An attractive answer is: in terms of their inferential roles, i.e. in terms of the role they play in building inferences.More precisely, we favor an approach, going back to Dosen and Sambin, in which the inferential role of a logical constant is captured by a double line rule which introduces it as reflecting structural links.Rule-based characterizations of logical constants are subject to the well known objection of Prior’s fake connective, tonk. We show that some double line rules also give rise to such pseudo logical constants. But then, we are able to find a property of a double line rules which guarantee that it defines a genuine logical constant. Thus we provide an alternative answer to Belnap’s requirement of conservatity in terms of a local requirement on double line rules.



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 76,101

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Connectives stranger than tonk.Heinrich Wansing - 2006 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 35 (6):653 - 660.
Understanding the Logical Constants and Dispositions.Corine Besson - 2009 - The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 5:1-24.
General-Elimination Harmony and the Meaning of the Logical Constants.Stephen Read - 2010 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (5):557-576.
Rule-circularity and the justification of deduction.By Neil Tennant - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (221):625–648.
Rule-Circularity and the Justification of Deduction.Neil Tennant - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (221):625 - 648.
Logical concepts and logical inferences.Paolo Casalegno - 2004 - Dialectica 58 (3):395–411.
Logical Constants.K. Warmbrõd - 1999 - Mind 108 (431):503 - 538.
Logical constants.J. A. Chadwick - 1927 - Mind 36 (141):1-11.
O Definici A Pojmu Toho, Co Není.Pavel Materna & Petr Kolář - 1994 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 1 (1):4-16.
What’s Wrong with Tonk.Roy Cook - 2005 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 34 (2):217 - 226.
Anything Goes.David Ripley - 2015 - Topoi 34 (1):25-36.
Wittgenstein and “Tonk”.Martin Gustafsson - 2014 - Philosophical Topics 42 (2):75-99.


Added to PP

33 (#355,652)

6 months
1 (#447,139)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Denis Bonnay
Université Paris Nanterre

Citations of this work

Intuitive and reflective inferences.Hugo Mercier & Dan Sperber - 2009 - In Keith Frankish & Jonathan St B. T. Evans (eds.), In Two Minds: Dual Processes and Beyond. Oxford University Press. pp. 149--170.
Advances in Proof-Theoretic Semantics.Peter Schroeder-Heister & Thomas Piecha (eds.) - 2015 - Cham, Switzerland: Springer Verlag.
Sentence connectives in formal logic.Lloyd Humberstone - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references